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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH# 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CHRISTOPHER MANUEL R. TAPIA, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 20070844-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of 
burglary# a second degree felony. R. 101-02. This Court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4-
103(2) (e) (West 2008) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did defense counsel render ineffective assistance or did the 
trial court plainly err where defendant has failed to establish 
that, in the absence of the testimony to which he now objects, 
the outcome of his trial would likely have been more favorable? 
In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
this Court must determine whether trial counsel's performance was 
deficient and, if so, whether the deficient performance 
prejudiced defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687 (1984). An ineffective assistance claim presents a question 
of law, reviewed on the record of the underlying trial. See 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, %% 16-17, 12 P.3d 92. To 
prevail on a claim of plain error, defendant must demonstrate 
that the trial court erred, that the error should have been 
obvious, and that, absent the error, he had a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
When asserted together, claims of plain error and 
ineffective assistance embody a "common standard," in that they 
both require a showing of prejudice or harm in order for a 
reviewing court to reverse. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 
n.15 (Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2004), governing burglary, 
provides: 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he 
enters or remains unlawfully in a building or 
any portion of a building with intent to 
commit: 
(b) theft [.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (West 2004), governing theft, 
provides: 
A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to deprive 
him thereof. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by amended information with one count 
each of burglary, a second degree felony; unlawful possession of 
another's identification documents, a class A misdemeanor; and 
unlawful possession of a dangerous weapon, a third degree felony. 
R. 9-10. A jury found defendant guilty of the burglary charge 
only. R. 96-98. The court sentenced defendant to one-to-fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison, consecutive to time he was 
already serving, and recommended credit for time served. R. 101-
02. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 106-07, 108-
09. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant, whose half-brother was affianced to Brittany 
Walton, began associating with Brittany while his brother was 
incarcerated. R. 130: 107-08. According to Brittany, 
11
 [defendant] wanted to be in a relationship with me, but I never 
wanted to be in a relationship with him." Id. at 125. 
Nonetheless, until several weeks prior to the events giving rise 
to this case, they spent a lot of time together. Id. at 122. 
They argued so frequently, however, that Brittany told defendant 
she "couldn't be around him anymore, and so we didn't have any 
contact, no phone calls or anything, for like three weeks." Id.. 
3 
Then, on March 13, 2007, Brittany, her young son, and 
defendant traveled from Ogden to Sunset to visit defendant's 
father. Id. at 109. On the way home that evening by bus, 
defendant and Brittany began arguing again. Id. at 109. The 
argument escalated as they changed busses in Ogden. When 
defendant got off at the stop for Brittany's apartment, Brittany, 
seeking to avoid further conflict, remained on the bus. She and 
her son rode to the end of the line and then back to a 7-11 
store, where Brittany telephoned a friend to come pick them up. 
Id. at 110-11. They stayed at the friend's house that night. Id. 
at 111. 
The next morning, Brittany went back to her apartment 
without her son. Id. There she found a pack by the front door 
full of things belonging to her and her fiance. Id. at 113. * 
She also found defendant in the apartment, going through both her 
possessions and her fiance's. Id. at 112-13. She told him to 
stop what he was doing and leave. Id. 113. Defendant told her 
he was taking his brother's stuff for safekeeping, he called her 
1
 According to Brittany, this pack and another found in the 
bedroom contained a Norelco shaver, men's clothing, a framed 
picture of Mother Mary, several DVDs, a cellphone, and breast-
feeding cream. R. 130: 117. Brittany testified that the cream 
and the picture belonged to her and that she and her fiance 
Spooled resources" for the DVDs and cellphone. Id. at 118-19. 
The police officer gave a slightly different recitation of what 
items were found by the door and in the bedroom. Compare R. 130: 
117 with R. 130: 132-33. The differences, however, are not 
relevant to the outcome of the case. 
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derogatory names, and he did not leave. Id.. Not wanting to 
deal further with him and needing to take her son to daycare, 
Brittany left, telling defendant that when she returned in a few 
minutes, uhe better be gone. . .and all my stuff better be 
there." Id. at 114. 
When Brittany returned, defendant was in the bedroom, still 
going through things. Id.. He said he was taking his brother's 
things to store them. She told him he had no right to take 
either her stuff or his brother's. Id. at 115. After arguing 
further about the possessions, she left, informing defendant she 
was going to call the police. Id.2 
The police arrived, and Brittany told Officer Checketts that 
she needed defendant out of her house, that he did not have 
permission to be there, that he was verbally aggressive to her 
and was threatening to take her things. Id. at 116. As Brittany 
entered the apartment behind the officer, she saw her fiance's 
backpack full of belongings by the front door. Brittany 
testified that she "asked [defendant], I was like, were you gonna 
take all that stuff. And right in front of the police, he said, 
yeah." Id. 
Officer Checketts testified that when he entered the 
apartment, he found defendant in the bedroom. Id. at 129. 
2
 Brittany testified that previously she "had him kicked 
out of my house a few times." R. 130: 124. 
5 
Defendant admitted to the officer that he did not live in the 
apartment, did not have a key, and did not have permission to be 
there. Id. at 130-31. He further conceded that many of the 
things he was gathering belonged to his brother, who had not 
given him permission to take anything and was unaware of his 
activity. Id. at 131. Indeed, defendant conceded he had not 
even talked to his brother "for several months." Id.. 
Based on these facts, Officer Checketts arrested defendant 
Id. at 134-35. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object to a prejudicial remark made by the victim and 
that the court committed plain error by failing to sua sponte 
exclude the remark. These related arguments fail on the common 
standard of prejudice. 
The allegedly problematic remark arose when the State asked 
the victim why she had a knife in her house. She responded that 
she had it for protection from defendant. Defendant now claims 
for the first time the remark was "highly prejudicial," 
warranting reversal of his conviction. 
Defendant's inadequately-briefed claim fails on the merits 
because he has not established prejudice. Even absent the 
remark, the jury knew that the victim had called the police many 
times on defendant and had thrown him out of the house before. 
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To also know that the victim felt she needed protection from 
defendant adds nothing new or prejudicial to the jury's knowledge 
base. Indeed, the jury did not convict defendant of burglary 
because the victim testified incidentally to having a knife as 
protection. The jury convicted defendant because he admitted to 
the police and the victim that he had collected two bags full of 
things that did not belong to him and that he intended to leave 
the apartment with those things. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT RENDER 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE NOR DID THE 
TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERR WHERE 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH 
THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF THE 
TESTIMONY TO WHICH HE NOW OBJECTS, 
THE OUTCOME OF HIS TRIAL WOULD 
LIKELY HAVE BEEN MORE FAVORABLE 
Defendant asserts two related arguments. First, he contends 
that his counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to 
Brittany's explanation that she had a knife in her apartment for 
protection from defendant "because of past instances." See Br. 
of Aplt. at 16 (quoting R. 130: 120). Second, he contends that 
the trial court plainly erred by not sua sponte conducting a rule 
404(b) analysis of the allegedly "prior bad act" remark about the 
knife and then by not excluding it. Id. at 13-15. He avers that 
the misstep by counsel or the court was harmful because defendant 
wwas in some type of relationship with the victim where they had 
spent a considerable amount of time together" that presumably 
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would have explained his actions enough to exonerate him if the 
derogatory evidence had not come in. Id. at 14, 17. 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
defendant must demonstrate both objectively deficient performance 
and prejudice. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, KH 19, 12 P.3d 
92. To prevail on a claim of plain error, defendant must show 
obvious legal error and prejudice. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1208 (Utah 1993). In cases such as this one, *[w]hen defendant 
raises the issues of both plain error and ineffective assistance 
of counsel, ya common standard is applicable.'" State v. 
Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 1992)(quoting State v. 
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 n.15 (Utah 1989)); accord State v. 
Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 822 (Utah App. 1994). ^Because the 
defendant must show prejudice to prevail under either argument, 
the xcommon standard' . . . functions as an analytical shortcut 
that avoids treatment of the other prongs of the ineffective 
assistance and plain error standards." Litherland, 2000 UT 76 at 
f31 n.14. 
In this case, after Officer Checketts arrested defendant and 
was handcuffing him, defendant threw a knife on the bed.3 R. 
3
 Officer Checketts explained at trial: txI had placed one 
hand in cuffs and was going to handcuff the other one is when he 
reached in [his back pocket] and grabbed [a sharp, unsheathed, 
fixed blade knife] and threw it [on the bed] as I was grabbing 
his hand." R. 130: 139; see also id. at 135-36. 
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The State: 
Witness: 
The State: 
Witness: 
The State: 
120: 130. On direct examination, Brittany testified that the 
knife belonged to her. The following exchange then occurred: 
The State: Why did you have that knife? 
Witness: Because—I don't know if I can 
answer this one. . . because, 
remember, I told you—anyways, 
someone else gave it to me— 
Was it— 
—for protection. 
Okay. 
Okay. Is that good enough? I 
don't-
You can answer the question. 
I'm not. . .trying to tell you 
what you should or should not 
be saying. 
But-
If you had it for protection, 
that's-
It was for protection from 
Chris [i.e., the defendant]. 
I'll just leave it at that. 
Because of past instances— 
Id. at 120. Defendant here cannot prevail on his claims of 
ineffective assistance and plain error because he has not, and 
cannot, demonstrate how the verdict on the burglary charge would 
likely have been better, absent the alleged error of admitting 
this testimony.4 
Witness: 
The State: 
Witness: 
4
 Notably, the jury acquitted defendant of the charge of 
possession of a dangerous weapon. R. 98. 
9 
At the outset, defendant's briefing is inadequate. Briefing 
requirements are articulated in Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, and require not only that the appealing party cite 
pertinent authority but also that the party develop that 
supporting authority through reasoned analysis. Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9). A party must carefully analyze and apply the cited 
authority to the facts of the case in order to convince the 
reviewing court that a specific and harmful mistake has been 
made. An issue is inadequately briefed wxwhen the overall 
analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of 
research and argument to the reviewing court.'" State v. Sloan, 
2003 UT App 170, fl3, 72 P.3d 138 (quoting Smith v. Smith, 1999 
UT App 370, %8, 995 P.2d 14). When this occurs, the law is well-
settled that this Court should not consider the issue on appeal. 
See, e.cr. , State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, fl3, 974 P.2d 269 (when a 
party fails to offer any meaningful analysis of a claim, 
reviewing court declines to consider the merits). 
Here, defendant argues that he was convicted because 
Brittany's testimony "was [used] to show [he] had a bad character 
and there had been instances in the past that caused the victim 
to believe she needed a knife to protect herself from him." Br. 
of Aplt. at 11. Defendant asserts that the jury's knowledge of 
Brittany's prior need for protection was "highly prejudicial." 
Id. at 13. Presumably, it was so prejudicial because it 
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undermined defendant's theory that his past relationship with 
Brittany was so close that it precluded his conduct from 
amounting to burglary. See id. at 14. Defendant nowhere, 
however, makes this argument explicit or articulates how relevant 
law, applied to specific facts, would help him reach the result 
he desires. On the basis of inadequate briefing, then, the Court 
may decline to even consider his claim. See, e.g., State v. 
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (appellate court is "not a 
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of 
argument"); Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). 
Even on the merits, the argument fails. Burglary requires 
"enter[ing] or remain[ing] unlawfully in a building. . .with 
intent to commit. . .theft." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
202(1)(b)(West 2004). Theft requires that a person "exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose 
to deprive him thereof." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (West 2004). 
In this case, although "entering" and "remaining" are alternative 
types of culpable conduct, defendant admitted to Officer 
Checketts that he both entered and remained in Brittany's 
apartment without her permission. R. 130: 131. While he also 
stated that he had previously entered the apartment without 
permission, in some cases climbing onto the roof and entering 
through a window, his past, apparently tolerated conduct does not 
render the entry in this case lawful. Id. Brittany made 
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absolutely clear to Officer Checketts and then to the jury as 
well, that defendant both entered and remained in her apartment 
without her permission and contrary to her express wish that he 
leave. IcL. at 112-14, 116, 121, 129, 134. 
Defendant did not dispute her testimony. In fact, he 
conceded his intent to exercise unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
While defendant took many items belonging to his half-brother, he 
told both Brittany and Officer Checketts that he was only 
"storing these things" for his brother. Id. at 119, 131. Even 
assuming arguendo the truth of defendant's statement, he also 
took items that he knew belonged to Brittany or in which Brittany 
had a partial interest. The two had argued over the picture of 
Mother Mary, evidencing not only defendant's knowledge that 
Brittany owned it but also his intent to deprive her of it. Id. 
at 114. The breast feeding cream was also plainly Brittany's. 
Id. at 118-19. Moreover, Brittany made clear to defendant that, 
while her fiance was incarcerated, his possessions were left in 
her care. And, because they were a couple, they owned many 
things, such as the DVDs and the cellphone, jointly. Id. at 115. 
After having been explicitly told this, defendant continued 
looking through and taking items, thus demonstrating his intent 
to deprive Brittany of them. 
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Under these factual circumstances, the jury did not convict 
defendant because Brittany revealed that she had acquired a knife 
for protection from defendant. Indeed, even without that 
evidence, the jury knew that Brittany had defendant "kicked out 
of" her house wa few times" and had called the police on him 
"numerous" times. Id. at 124. Given defendant's history of 
overstaying his welcome until the police were summoned, 
Brittany's expressed need for protection from defendant did not 
tell the jury anything it could not readily surmise from the 
unchallenged evidence before it. 
In reality, the jury convicted defendant of burglary because 
he entered an apartment that was not his own without permission, 
he collected two bags full of things that he knew were 
individually or jointly owned by Brittany and her fiance, and he 
intended to leave the apartment with those items. Defendant's 
claim fails because he has wholly failed to establish that, 
absent the incidental reference to defendant's impliedly 
aggressive nature, the verdict on the burglary charge would have 
been different. 
13 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction on one count of burglary, a second degree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this Jj_ day of May, 2008. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
yfimuA-vt C. /WTmi ^ 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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